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Abstract 21 
Theorists have used the concept habitus to explain how skilled agents are capable of 22 
responding in an infinite number of ways to the infinite number of possible situations that 23 
they encounter in their field of practice. According to some perspectives, habitus is seen to 24 
represent a form of regulated improvisation that functions below the threshold of 25 
consciousness. However, Bourdieu (1990) argued that rational and conscious computation 26 
may be required in situations of ‘crises’ where habitus proves insufficient as a basis for our 27 
actions. In the current paper, I draw on a range of evidence which indicates that conscious 28 
intervention (including self-reflective sensory consciousness) is required not only at points of 29 
crises but also as skilled performers engage in the mundane actions/practices that characterise 30 
their everyday training and performance regimes. The interaction of conscious learning and 31 
unconscious schemata leads to the development of a reflexive habitus which allows 32 
performers to refine and adapt embodied movement patterns over time. 33 
Keywords: Habitus, Bourdieu, Expertise, Consciousness, Discursive Practice, Bodily 34 
Awareness. 35 
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Habitual reflexivity and skilled action 46 
The term habit is often used by psychologists and sociologists to explain how we 47 
negotiate our world of action without consciously attending to the mechanical details that 48 
govern control of our movements. The effortless manner in which we complete quotidian 49 
endeavours emphasises the utility of habit. Indeed, one must recognise the value of 50 
‘mechanistic’ action as bodily engagement with our environment would likely prove halting 51 
and dysfluent if every movement required careful consideration. However, traditional 52 
psychological conceptualisations of habit tend to portray human behaviour as a conditioned 53 
reflex thereby imbuing the term with a peculiar degree of inertia (e.g., Skinner, 1938). 54 
According to this perspective, human actors possess a repetitive or mechanical-like tendency 55 
to respond to stimuli in a preordained manner (Crossley, 2001a). Such conceptualisations 56 
denote the impassivity of human action and while they may possess some value in explaining 57 
how we perform simple actions (actions which once mastered require no further attention) 58 
they appear ill-suited to an explanation of how skilled agents are capable of refining complex 59 
actions or addressing the variety of challenges (e.g., injury) that are a ubiquitous feature of 60 
their training and performance regimes.  61 
 Theorists such as Mauss (1979) and Bourdieu (1977) sought to cast aside the 62 
common conceptualisation of habit as a mechanical assembly or pre-formed programme.  63 
According to Bourdieu, the term habit denotes mechanical behaviour whereas ‘habitus’ 64 
implies flexibility and dexterity. Habitus suggests a form of ‘practical reason’ (i.e., le sense 65 
pratique) which constitutes an embodied knowledge of how one may efficiently negotiate 66 
one’s world of action (Crossley, 2013). The primary habitus represents schemes of action and 67 
perception tacitly acquired during childhood while the secondary habitus involves schemata 68 
acquired subsequently through ‘specialized pedagogical labour that is typically shortened in 69 
duration, accelerated in pace, and explicit in organization’ (Wacquant, 2014: 7). This process 70 
Habitual reflexivity 4 
 
 
 
involves the embodiment of the principles of social organization thereby enabling humans to 71 
spontaneously generate an infinite array of appropriate actions ‘which no rule, however 72 
complex, can foresee’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 9). This system of dispositions means that 73 
individuals are disposed, but not determined, to act in a certain way based on their previous 74 
experiences (Glăveanu, 2012).   75 
Habitus offers researchers an important conceptual and analytic tool for exploring the 76 
nature of social determination and human agency. Despite the undoubted utility of this 77 
concept, and the extensive influence it has had on thinking within the field of body studies, 78 
Bourdieu has been criticised for not making full use of the term. For example, although in his 79 
later work he emphasised the generative capacity of habitus, he failed to offer a detailed 80 
account of how the habitus is formed at either the individual or collective levels. Crossley 81 
(2013: 147) argues that Merleau-Ponty’s work advances the positions of both Bourdieu and 82 
Mauss by offering a ‘dynamic account of the process in which habits are formed, reformed 83 
and, in some cases, extinguished across time, exploring this process and identifying its 84 
mechanisms’. Despite the historical denigration of the concept of habit, thinkers such as 85 
Merleau-Ponty (2002) and Dewey (1922) sought to rehabilitate it in an attempt to theorize the 86 
dispositional aspect of human agency. For Merleau-Ponty, habits are structures of behaviour 87 
which are shaped and reshaped by the dynamic and ongoing interactions between actor and 88 
environment. Dewey agrees with this perspective but builds upon it by emphasising how the 89 
to and fro of social interaction shapes habit. Indeed, the unpredictability of social situations 90 
are such that an element of our habits are always in flux leaving us with little choice but to 91 
subject them to conscious revision.  92 
Bourdieu viewed habit as a constraint upon freedom which one may only be liberated 93 
from during points of crises (Crossley, 2013). For Grosz (2013), habit promises freedom by 94 
providing living beings with the energy and singularity of purpose that allows them to 95 
Habitual reflexivity 5 
 
 
 
respond creatively to their environment. Grosz argues (2013: 223) that habit does not 96 
mechanize or reduce consciousness to unconsciousness but, instead, brings about a new kind 97 
of consciousness, one that is ‘not aware of itself but prone to act, that is activated by the 98 
possibility of its acting, that knows but cannot know that it knows’. This seems to place habit 99 
very close to instinct but Grosz (2013) sees habit as possessing the capacity for invention and 100 
transformation. Crossley (2013: 153) suggests that Dewey conceived of habit in a similar 101 
manner by proposing that this structure helps ‘carry forward impulses to their consummation 102 
and which allow us, in deliberation, which is itself a habit, both to plan and to implement a 103 
plan’. Although theorists such as Grosz and Merleau-Ponty portray habit as possessing a 104 
generative capacity, these embodied dispositions are seen as functioning below the threshold 105 
of consciousness. Unfortunately, this perspective does not accord with a wide range of 106 
empirical evidence which indicates that skilled performers regularly use conscious reflection 107 
to alter habitual routines. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on an unreflective lived body 108 
has been criticised for creating ‘a polarization of “lived experience” versus “representations” 109 
that neglects the fruitful option of “lived corporeal reflection”, that is, concrete but 110 
representational and reflective body consciousness’ (Shusterman, 2005: 165). In the current 111 
paper, I argue that one may view habit(us) as representing a form of embodied or practical 112 
action and yet acknowledge, as Dewey does, that somatic reflection is required if we are to 113 
successfully refine ‘attenuated’ habits.  114 
This line of enquiry has been influenced by the argument that habitus requires further 115 
development to better accommodate reflexivity (the way the self becomes conscious of itself) 116 
as a core component (see Bunn, 2016; Lahire, 2011). In particular, I draw on Crossley 117 
(2001a, b) and Sweetman’s (2003) proposal that the habitus is characterised by a reflexivity 118 
and flexibility which allows the agent to shape secondary dispositions. I start by considering 119 
the findings from a number of body studies that have used habitus as an analytical tool to 120 
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explain how the embodied agent acquires and performs complex skills. Next, I critically 121 
evaluate the proposal that these skills are characterised by a pre-reflective level of bodily 122 
awareness. In the following section I argue that habitual reflexivity allows performers to 123 
address the ‘bodily crises’ (e.g., injury, attenuated movement patterns) which will occur at 124 
some point during their careers.  125 
The paper subsequently draws on a range of evidence which indicates that conscious 126 
intervention is required not only at points of crises but also as skilled performers engage in 127 
the mundane actions/practices that characterise their everyday training and performance 128 
regimes. In doing so, I consider a body of research which points to the important role that 129 
consciousness and discursive practice plays in facilitating ‘continuous improvement’ amongst 130 
skilled performers. This evidence counters the commonly held belief that actors do not 131 
become aware of their corporeal schema when everything is running smoothly but only when 132 
things go wrong. The paper concludes by considering how future research may better 133 
understand the process by which skilled performers advance their bodily capacities over time.  134 
Body work 135 
A number of researchers have used habitus as an analytical tool to examine how 136 
athletes advance their bodily capacities by engaging in ‘body work’. Wacquant’s (2004) 137 
ethnographical work exploring how boxers actively cultivate their bodies as a form of capital 138 
is one of the most influential treatments of habitus in the body studies literature. Wacquant 139 
(2004) extended Bourdieu’s work by emphasizing habitus as ‘bodily capital’ and dedicated 140 
greater attention to the nature of skill acquisition (Bourdieu devoted little attention to a 141 
discussion of how the accumulation of bodily capital occurs). Central to Wacquant’s thesis is 142 
the belief that the rules of life the boxer follows pertain not to a reflective evaluation of how 143 
they should or should not move but ‘rather, from a sort of “concrete science” of their own 144 
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bodies’ (2004: 128). Wacquant (2013: 24) holds that practical mastery functions beneath the 145 
threshold of consciousness and that mental understanding is likely to be a hindrance in the 146 
ring ‘so long as one has not grasped boxing technique with one’s body’. 147 
Although Wacquant (1995: 73) sees a limited role for conscious processes he argues 148 
that body work requires the pugilist to ‘constantly monitor every part of his body and 149 
synchronize a large number of movements’.  In fact, Wacquant provides numerous examples 150 
of how these boxers monitor their bodily movements but he accords this no status as a form 151 
of consciousness (Noble & Watkins, 2003). In referring to his own progress he reveals that ‘I 152 
feel like I’m getting my punches off better and I concentrate on landing cleanly on my 153 
imaginary target with every one of them’ (2004: 120). Wacquant also dedicates attention to 154 
the discursive element of training. In doing so, he revealed that boxing coaches deliver 155 
instructions using an economy of words and gestures. Whilst the coaches in Wacquant’s gym 156 
appear to avoid bombarding their athletes with a barrage of verbal instruction Wacquant 157 
recalls being exhorted by his coach to ‘throw a one-two, duck to slip my right an’ counter 158 
with another one-two from d’other side’ (2004: 65) and to ensure that he does not leave his 159 
right hand by his side but that he places it against his ‘right cheek, to protect himself from the 160 
left hook’ (2004: 103). Together, these examples emphasize the importance that didactic 161 
learning plays in shaping the secondary habitus.  162 
A number of researchers have been inspired by Wacquant’s call to engage in what he 163 
termed ‘carnal ethnography’. For example, Spencer (2009) conducted participant 164 
observations and interviews in a mixed martial arts (MMA) club to explore how these 165 
athletes engaged in body callusing through the use of reflexive body techniques. Spencer 166 
(2009) argued that to gain mastery over their movement, body techniques are continually 167 
incorporated and combined with the fighter’s existing technical corpus and that this means 168 
that the fighter’s habitus is in a perpetual state of flux or metamorphosis.  169 
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Spencer (2009: 127) provides one particularly illuminating passage in discussing how the 170 
performers were taught body techniques:  171 
Everyone gathers in a circle watching intently what George is trying to show and tell 172 
everyone. George gets on his back and Philip enters his closed guard. ‘So we are 173 
going to practice arm bars. First grab the back of his collar on the same side as the 174 
arm that you are going to do the arm bar [with], with your palm up as close as you can 175 
to his neck, trying to keep your wrist straight [he demonstrates, grabbing the collar of 176 
his gi deep and firm]. Then grab on the end of the sleeve of the arm you are going to 177 
arm bar with your thumb out [he demonstrates, digging his fingers into the sleeve of 178 
the gi, gripping it firmly]. Then you put your foot on his hip, keeping your knee close 179 
to his arm and push off. While you are pushing off, slide your other leg across his 180 
back [he demonstrates, fluidly gliding his body across the mat and placing himself in 181 
position for the arm bar]. Then you just grab with both hands firmly on the inside of 182 
his arm and submit him [pulls down on the arm and Philip taps to show that the arm 183 
bar has worked effectively]. Any questions?’ No one responds and George exclaims, 184 
‘pick a partner and do the technique over and over.  185 
 186 
Although these instructions seem remarkably prescriptive, Spencer (2009) portrays 187 
the learner as a parrot who does not reflect or engage in any conscious thought but who 188 
merely seeks to repeat these diktats. That is, through a process of mimesis and repetition 189 
these fighters learn new techniques that become ingrained in the body. According to this 190 
perspective, the fighter does not need to possess a conceptual understanding of how they 191 
should execute these actions. Instead, one develops a sensory or embodied understanding 192 
through active and constant engagement in the task. Spencer argues that the refinement and 193 
development of new habits is a social act and that MMA fighters learn and unlearn body 194 
techniques but that reflection is seen as representing an impediment to this process. He 195 
further proposes that ‘all the action in battle is pre-reflective, or beyond thought’ (2009: 129). 196 
Spencer (2009: 132) acknowledges that fighters can develop bad habits but argues that 197 
although proprioceptive memory is malleable ‘the “conscious” actor cannot by fiat change it; 198 
bodily memories change over time and in and through social working and reworking of 199 
bodies’.   200 
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Crossley (2005: 9) devised the term reflexive body techniques to explain how the 201 
embodied agent may ‘work back upon the body, so as to modify, maintain or thematize it in 202 
some way’. Similar to ‘body callusing’, this technique is seen as operating below the 203 
threshold of language and consciousness. Crossley (2001a) argues that it is only through an 204 
embodied and pre-reflective know-how that one can execute fast-paced skills – a knowledge 205 
which can only be acquired through playing the game and which precludes reflective or 206 
intellectual mastery. According to this perspective a fighter should not consciously monitor 207 
or control his/her actions as he or she works the bag or spars with a training partner. Such 208 
engagement is seen as likely to prove deleterious to embodied coping. Instead, through 209 
extensive practice and repetition the fighter’s body spontaneously reacts to their opponent 210 
based on the sedimentation of body techniques in training. For example, Spencer (2009) 211 
argues that it is through proprioceptive memory that the body can sense what is required and 212 
responds with contextually-appropriate action. Although these ‘reflexive’ techniques point to 213 
the generative capacity of habits the precise means by which reflexive embodiment might 214 
allow performers to alter well-established habits (i.e., those that have been automated for 215 
many years) remains open to question.  216 
A common thread that links each of the preceding arguments is the notion that 217 
reflection is unhelpful because it is not part of the performance itself (e.g., the fighter does 218 
not have time to think or plan their course of action). However, attending to action as one 219 
familiarises oneself with a skill does not preclude the possibility that pugilists will eventually 220 
utilise these skills pre-reflectively in a fight. Indeed, one can think and reflect as one learns a 221 
new skill and having automatised the movement through thousands of repetitions proceed to 222 
perform the action without conscious control in the heat of competitive battle. Thinking about 223 
the instructions one has received from a coach need not disrupt or hinder skill learning. That 224 
is, acquiring a conceptual understanding of why a particular type of movement may be 225 
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effective will not inevitably lead to the reinvestment of conscious attention in proceduralised 226 
movement. For example, in seeking to explain how Tae Kwon Do practitioners transition 227 
from ‘thinking’ to ‘doing’ Graham (2014: 67) explains that this process initially requires the 228 
mind to dominate. Beginners must ‘focus their attention on patterns, kicks and prearranged 229 
sparring’ and that these techniques are broken down into step-by-step movements and then 230 
repeated innumerable times. These transitions will eventually be overseen by a pre-reflective 231 
level of bodily awareness. However, I argue that this latter form of corporeal engagement is 232 
not unconscious in nature but instead functions in such a way as to allow skilled performers 233 
to consciously monitor their movement proficiency and to reflexively act back upon the body. 234 
Let me now devote a little more attention to this important issue. 235 
Re-conceptualising pre-reflective awareness 236 
Those theorists who conceive of habitus as a pre-reflective involvement in our 237 
environment often draw on Merleau-Ponty’s (2002: 166) conceptualisation of habit as a 238 
knowledge that is ‘in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and 239 
cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort’. Merleau-Ponty (2002) asserted that 240 
spontaneity will always facilitate optimal functioning while bodily awareness or somatic 241 
reflection will compromise smooth and efficient performance. He insisted that spontaneous 242 
bodily intentionality is a pre-requisite for successful performance as our movement is 243 
governed by a spontaneity which will not tolerate any commands, not even those which we 244 
like to give to ourselves. Although it might make sense to follow this advice when one is 245 
moving efficiently it is difficult to fathom how a reliance on spontaneity will allow a 246 
performer to address the wide range of challenges that face the performing body (e.g., injury, 247 
aging etc). According to Shusterman (2008: 13) ‘we cannot simply trust our habits to correct 248 
themselves through unconscious trial and error or through eventual evolutionary 249 
adjustments’. In fact, to act spontaneously or to remain focused on the effects of our actions 250 
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will merely reinforce these bad habits and compromise our ability to enhance our bodily 251 
capacities (Shusterman, 2008).  252 
Unfortunately, skilled action is often characterized in terms of a body that is so 253 
transparent as to become invisible or ‘absent’. However, when authors such as Merleau-Ponty 254 
or Crossley portray habitus as being ‘pre-reflective’ in nature we should be careful not to take 255 
this to mean that our well-learned movements are performed without awareness. Pre-256 
reflective bodily self-awareness occurs when ‘one’s self is experienced or lived through as 257 
the subject of awareness, without any process of reflection on itself’ (Colombetti, 2011: 303). 258 
Here, the performer may experience a bodily awareness that remains marginal or recessive. 259 
So, when pre-reflectively aware of our bodies (as performers may be when in a state of 260 
absorption or ‘flow’) we may not explicitly attend to the position or movement of our limbs 261 
as we execute the task but that does not mean that we do not have a feeling of how the 262 
movement was performed – whether we moved with the desired level of rhythm or fluency, 263 
for example. In other words, these feelings are felt in the sense that they contribute to our 264 
sensory experience and to the sense of agency over one’s movement (Toner, Montero, & 265 
Moran, 2016). 266 
Many theorists who espouse the value of pre-reflective engagement with our 267 
environment seem to forget that expert action is not just confined to the competitive arena. 268 
Indeed, experts spend the vast majority of their time engaged in planning and reflection in 269 
between competition. This might involve moments of quiet contemplation where the athlete 270 
reflects upon the efficacy of their actions (see Lahire, 2011). Moreover, knowledge is 271 
constantly exchanged amongst training partners and the huge array of sports scientists that 272 
accompany high performance teams means that performers are always privy to data 273 
pertaining to their movement and performance proficiency. Through conscious self-274 
regulation of their action or instructions received from practitioners, performers often decide 275 
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that to rectify ‘attenuated’ movement patterns they have little choice but to switch to a 276 
reflective level of bodily awareness. This form of bodily awareness requires performers to 277 
bring the body into the ‘foreground’ of their awareness where they reflectively objectify its 278 
quality or efficiency. 279 
Habitual Reflexivity 280 
Our very capacity for reflection or reflexivity appears to be rooted in the habitus. 281 
Crossley (2001b) argues that Bourdieu underestimated the extent to which reflexivity enters 282 
into everyday life. While Bourdieu proposed that radical reflection and reflexivity may only 283 
occur at periods of crisis, Crossley (2001b) contends that we are capable of reflexive action 284 
whatever the circumstances.  Socialisation equips the agent with ‘a durable capacity for 285 
talking to and reflecting upon their self, and indeed for viewing problems and situations from 286 
different points of view’ (Crossley, 2001b: 145). Similarly, Sweetman (2003) posits that 287 
contemporary conditions may actively contribute to the development of a particular type of 288 
habitus which is inherently reflexive in nature. The complexity and speed of change which 289 
characterises ‘late modern societies’ calls for a heightened degree of reflexivity. This 290 
orientation towards the contemporary environment may ‘itself be regarded as a form of 291 
habitus, itself the outcome of an adaptation to – rather than a distanciation from – the 292 
changing nature of the social terrain’ (Sweetman, 2003: 543).  293 
There is a considerable volume of evidence to indicate that skilled performers must 294 
adopt such a reflexive stance in order to address ‘attenuated’ habits. The cultivation of 295 
reflexive body techniques (i.e., that enable the foregrounding of the body) allows the 296 
performer to act back upon the body in an attempt to acquire new schemes of perception and 297 
action. Importantly, this form of reflexivity is a component of the habitus and we can 298 
continue to draw upon our primary habitus as part of the solution to a problem. Ultimately, 299 
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habitual reflexivity enables the performer to consciously engage with the various options for 300 
change that is at his or her disposal. Let us now turn our attention to a consideration of a 301 
specific event (i.e., the emergence of ‘crises’) that presents the skilled performer with little 302 
choice but to subject their habitual responses to conscious computation/reflective awareness. 303 
‘Crises’ 304 
A large volume of empirical evidence suggests that skilled athletes and performing 305 
artists are confronted by a variety of ‘bodily crises’ over the course of their careers 306 
(Wainwright, Williams, & Turner, 2005). Elite training regimes place extraordinary pressures 307 
on the performing body and no matter how closely performers might attend to training and 308 
rehabilitation protocols their bodies inevitably face decay. According to Shilling (2008: 16) 309 
crisis occurs when ‘there develops a significant mismatch or conflict between the social and 310 
physical surroundings in which individuals live and their biological and bodily potentialities’. 311 
These crises are likely to represent a serious threat to the embodied subject as one’s habitual 312 
way of moving is severely compromised. Although crises present a formidable challenge to 313 
the performer they might also offer the possibility to explore and extend one’s capabilities or 314 
bodily capacities.  315 
As noted above, Bourdieu (1977) recognised that crises occur and that there may be 316 
occasions where habitus proves insufficient as a basis for action. However, Bourdieu 317 
considered these crises to be rare occurrences while other theorists, such as Dewey, see them 318 
as being part of the natural fabric of our worldly existence. Dewey (1922) believed that the 319 
demands and unpredictability of social situations are such that an element of our habits are 320 
always in flux thereby requiring reflective intervention and reworking. As a leading 321 
proponent of pragmatism, Dewey (1922: 41) viewed human activity as ‘projective, dynamic 322 
in quality and ready for “overt manifestation”’. Although he acknowledged the value of 323 
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mechanism, he dismissed the notion that a reliance on spontaneity (or end-gaining) will 324 
facilitate optimal functioning. Instead, the embodied agent is required to find a line of action 325 
which will inhibit the undesired behaviour and which ‘by instituting another course of action 326 
will bring him to his desired end’ (Dewey, 1922: 35). There are a number of forms of 327 
pragmatic action that might be required to address these crises. I start by considering the role 328 
that consciousness and affect plays in skilled performers’ training regimes. 329 
Altering habits: the role of consciousness and affect 330 
Highly-skilled performers engage in practice activities which require their ‘full 331 
attention and concentration’ (Ericsson, 2006: 700). Indeed, research has revealed that athletes 332 
identify weaknesses by engaging in conscious regulation of their actions or through 333 
conversations with one’s coach or training partner. ‘Somaesthetic awareness’ (see 334 
Shusterman, 2008; 2012), or heightened body consciousness, may serve as one regulatory 335 
process which is particularly influential in helping performers to avoid ‘prematurely arrested 336 
development’ (Ericsson, 2013: 893). Athletes may use somaesthetic awareness during 337 
deliberate practice (where they strive purposefully and single-mindedly to achieve specific 338 
and challenging goals in a deliberate attempt to improve their skills) to identify and 339 
subsequently alter ‘attenuated’ movement patterns. In fact, researchers have demonstrated the 340 
importance of utilising a reflexive level of bodily awareness if athletes are to successfully 341 
refine well established movements (e.g., Carson, Collins, & Jones, 2014; Collins, Morriss, & 342 
Trower, 1999). This form of representational body consciousness operates through the 343 
recruitment of sensory-motor processes and is characterised by certain affective qualities. 344 
This argument aligns with the ‘enactive approach’ which considers cognition as not just 345 
embodied but also intrinsically affective (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009). That is, our 346 
movements come with distinctive affective qualities such as graceful, clumsy, or beautiful.  347 
Sheets-Johnstone (1999) referred to these bodily feelings as ‘kinetic portrayals’ and argued 348 
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that they evoke affective nuances that may not be easily articulated but whose quality is 349 
nevertheless directly grasped by the observer.1 350 
As previously argued, when moving and performing efficiently, the skilled agent is 351 
likely to experience their body pre-reflectively. In this case, although the body may remain in 352 
the background of one’s awareness it remains clearly present in experience. According to 353 
Damasio (1994: 150) we are only subtly aware of these feelings but ‘aware enough to be able 354 
to report instantly on its quality’. However, to alter a deeply embedded habit, one that has 355 
been shaped by powerful forces of socialisation, performers appear to have little choice but to 356 
take the body as an intentional object and to place it at the centre of their attention. Although 357 
Bourdieusian scholars tend to reject the idea of mental representations as explanations for our 358 
embodied habits, such change is only possible when we become explicitly aware of the 359 
somatic sensations that accompany our movement and when we ‘focus on our awareness of 360 
the object of our awareness through its representation in our minds’ (Shusterman, 2005: 158). 361 
To enact change, the agent must subject their action to a ‘second-order act of consciousness’ 362 
(Colombetti, 2014: 121) but this experiential state will nevertheless evoke affective feelings, 363 
such as frustration as one struggles with the challenges presented by this process, or pleasure 364 
as one experiences the body moving with more grace or power.   365 
 To initiate this process, pedagogists may use approaches such as ‘contrast’ drills to 366 
initially increase the athlete’s physical and mental awareness of the desired versus undesired 367 
movement positioning. Importantly, practitioners will help their performers cultivate both a 368 
conceptual and an embodied understanding or ‘feel’ for the new movement. The instructor 369 
will explicate why the new movement is necessary but will also use a variety of other 370 
techniques – including simulation and gesture (discussed in the next section) – to help the 371 
performer develop a sensory understanding of the desired movement. Throughout this 372 
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process, affective qualities of movement play an important role by revealing our level of 373 
progress.  374 
In seeking to alter my running technique, for example, my movement will likely 375 
become halting and disjointed as I try to adjust my stride length. Initially, I must consciously 376 
attend to my action to ensure that I execute it in the desired manner. This is an attentionally 377 
demanding process and results in me neglecting to attend to certain strategic elements of 378 
performance such as my pace or rate of breathing. Affective qualities of my movement serve 379 
a motivational function by informing me that I am moving with greater efficiency and that 380 
my action is more powerful or streamlined. By retaining representational awareness I can 381 
appreciate the increasing ease, grace and fluency with which I am beginning to execute the 382 
new movement pattern. Visualisation plays a crucial process here by helping me to establish 383 
a clear and vivid mental image of the technique I wish to adopt. I may conjure up this image 384 
as I run and use it as a guide to my action. Alternatively, when running in an urban 385 
environment, I might glance in a shop front window to quickly check my stride length, 386 
posture, or general running form. This process involves comparing the relationship between 387 
an internal image (forged after thousands of training miles), bodily sensations and the 388 
reflected image (Hockey, 2013). All my senses are engaged in monitoring my progress. Not 389 
alone does my foot-strike feel lighter but it produces a distinctly different sound of which I 390 
am acutely aware.  391 
None of the above involves a spontaneous reaction to my environment but, instead, 392 
requires the use of representational awareness to address problems of misperception and 393 
misuse of my body (Shusterman, 2005). Of course, although this evaluation may represent a 394 
subjective analysis of what one considers to represent good or bad running technique, it 395 
would be remiss to ignore the role that logics of practice (e.g., bio-scientific knowledge that 396 
informs coaching behaviour) play in shaping the latter belief. These doxic values are never 397 
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open to question through our practical engagement in sport. Aside from this point, my 398 
intention in this section was not to suggest that we can disconnect from our embodied manner 399 
of being. In fact, the representations discussed are grounded in our physical and perceptual 400 
interactions with our environment.  401 
Discursive practice 402 
Discursive practice, or recurring episodes of face-to-face interaction, would also 403 
appear to play a crucial role in helping skilled performers to refine movement patterns. Habits 404 
arise from our interactions with the world and these interactions invariably involve other 405 
human actors. Given that coaching is essentially a dynamic and negotiated practice, it is 406 
surprising that scholars such as Bourdieu have downplayed the discursive dimension to sports 407 
training (Noble & Watkins, 2003). He argued that the body is not taught via ‘theoretical 408 
discourse’ but that sports trainers speak directly to the body as athletes possess a practical 409 
knowledge – that is, they have an intellectual understanding of the ‘movement to make or not 410 
to make, without being able actually to do what one has understood, for lack of 411 
comprehension through the body’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 144). In Pascalian meditations, Bourdieu 412 
refers to stage directors who employ pedagogic practices that seek to suspend intellectual and 413 
discursive understanding by using exercises that encourage actors to rediscover bodily 414 
postures that are capable of evoking certain emotions and cognitions.  415 
There are a number of other ways for instructors to ‘talk directly to the body’ thereby 416 
minimising the use of explicit instruction. For example, by using mirrors or video, sports 417 
coaches can help athletes become aware of how they appear when assuming certain positions 418 
or performing certain movements (Toner & Moran, 2015). Of course, the performer’s habitus 419 
may establish a propensity to engage in such behaviour in the first place. The instructor may 420 
draw the athlete’s attention to the affective qualities associated with different movement 421 
positions which will help them to associate ‘visual forms’ with different somatic sensations. 422 
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Through associative training, practitioners can help athletes to infer from their affective 423 
experiences whether they are moving efficiently or in the desired manner. But this process 424 
still requires the practitioner to explain why the new position may be beneficial and to explain 425 
various means by which the athlete may attain it. This latter process also involves developing 426 
in the performer a sensory understanding of what the new movement will feel like. 427 
Researchers have recently outlined the perils of explicit instruction (i.e., it leads to the build-428 
up of verbalizable knowledge which can be reinvested in automated skills) and have 429 
recommended that sport coaches use analogies or metaphors instead. For example, when 430 
performing a basketball free-throw participants have been advised to ‘shoot as if you are 431 
trying to put cookies into a cookie jar on a high shelf’ (Lam, Maxwell, & Masters, 2009:  432 
181). Under normal conditions, the use of this metaphorical visualisation may benefit 433 
learning by acting as a constraint that encourages performers to discover their own action co-434 
ordination solution. Unfortunately, however, these approaches have been found to be less 435 
effective when used with skilled performers who are attempting to alter a well-established 436 
movement pattern (see Rendell, Farrow, Masters & Plummer, 2011). As alluded to earlier, 437 
theoretical discourse (involving the explication of the desired versus undesired movement) is 438 
required when the performer must analyze their technique for purposes of refinement. 439 
The use of gesture may be another pedagogical practice which enables performers to 440 
embody a new movement whilst avoiding the transmission of an excessive number of explicit 441 
instructions. For example, researchers have shown that teachers use gestures alongside 442 
speech as a matter of routine when teaching mathematical concepts (e.g., Alibali & Nathan, 443 
2007). This points to the embodiment of mathematical knowledge and how cognition is 444 
grounded in perception and action and in the physical environment (Wilson, 2002). The use 445 
of representational gestures (i.e., gestures that depict semantic content, either literally or 446 
metaphorically, via handshape or motion trajectory; Alibali & Nathan, 2012) are particularly 447 
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commonplace in pedagogical encounters in sport. For example, gestures will accompany any 448 
attempts by the coach/instructor to verbalize how a movement might be performed or how it 449 
might feel. A golf coach wishing to improve their student’s movement through impact might 450 
articulate how the clubhead needs to be released but will also gesture this movement (i.e., 451 
rotating their hands from right-to-left). These representational gestures manifest simulations 452 
of action and perception by activating sensory, premotor, and motor areas of the brain in 453 
action-appropriate ways. These simulations play an important role in both language 454 
comprehension and the manipulation of mental images. Ultimately, they arise because 455 
thinking is based in perception and action.  456 
While such instances of discursive practice might facilitate the embodiment of a new 457 
movement pattern, one must be sufficiently motivated to start, and persist with, what is 458 
undoubtedly a challenging process. Pedagogical encounters involve a series of affective 459 
transactions and it is possible for pedagogists to imbue in their performers a sense of 460 
excitement or enthrallment about the prospect of extending their current movement capacities 461 
(e.g., by altering well-established habits). In considering the role affect plays in pedagogical 462 
relationships, Watkins (2010) drew on Spinoza’s distinction between affectus (the force of an 463 
affecting body) and affectio (the impact it leaves on the one affected). Watkins (2010) 464 
explored how engagement with the world and others generates affects which become 465 
sedimented during the process of learning. The success of pedagogical relationships is 466 
dependent on both parties recognizing each other’s worth ‘with this intersubjective 467 
acknowledgement being integral to their sense of self’ (Watkins: 2010: 273). Moments of 468 
recognition, which are characterized by bodily sensations and which accumulate over time, 469 
function as affectus. This accumulation of affect may promote in performers both the desire 470 
and the capacity to learn. Pedagogists may choose to elicit such affective responses by 471 
‘performing’ (e.g., delivering content in an animated manner) in an effort to generate an 472 
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excitement and interest which students subsequently embody. At the elite level, this sense of 473 
excitement will motivate performers to embrace the challenge that technical change entails 474 
and to help them to remain committed to the chosen method of refinement. 475 
Structural constraints 476 
While the examples outlined in the preceding section would suggest that performers 477 
are free to make certain choices about how they might alter embodied habits, one must 478 
recognise that the performer’s primary habitus will predispose them to unintentionally 479 
reproduce the structural arrangements of which they form a part. Moreover, the doxic 480 
components of sport limit the possibilities open to the performer. To explain, high-481 
performance environments represent ‘structuring structures’ to which performers must adapt. 482 
In fact, performance in these fields is structured in ways that exert powerful forces on 483 
individuals and mechanisms are often in place to ensure the perseverance of these structures. 484 
For example, these environments are characterised by the use of a host of disciplinary 485 
techniques - such as surveillance - that have the capacity to render athletes docile (Markula & 486 
Pringle, 2006). Furthermore, if we acquire our own reflexivity via an ‘appropriation of the 487 
view of the generalised other, then the limits of our own reflexivity are, in effect, the limits of 488 
the collective representations of our society’ (Crossley, 2001b: 150). However, this 489 
predisposition to act in particular ways should not entirely inhibit the agent’s strategic 490 
capabilities (Crossley, 2001a, b).  491 
Take, for example, Hilgers (2009: 747) argument that agents can ‘emancipate 492 
themselves from their determinisms’. To do so may require them to develop a sociological 493 
consciousness (including knowledge of various structural constraints) which Hilgers has 494 
argued is indispensable in assisting the agent’s efforts to modify habitus - though it is 495 
insufficient to bring about a permanent transformation of dispositions.  The freedom to exert 496 
volitional control may arise if the actor is aware of their determinisms and thereby positioned 497 
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to choose or transform them.  While we can never be entirely free of our dispositions, 498 
maintaining a reflexive distance allows us to expose structures and thereby provide us with 499 
the power to exert self-control. Such an approach sheds light on the mechanisms which 500 
‘make it possible for agents to identify the best situations for attaining their goals, and for the 501 
collectivity or politics to effect transformations of objective structures’ (Hilgers, 2009: 746). 502 
Enhancing agency 503 
Although the agent’s capacity to enact change is constrained by the structural 504 
arrangements of which they form a part there is a wide range of evidence which points to the 505 
role that consciousness and discursive practice plays in the revision of habitual movement 506 
patterns. One can recognise the value of consciousness without necessarily believing that 507 
dynamic action is governed by the application of explicit rules. Instead, a more moderate 508 
version of intellectualism would involve the belief that certain reflective processes allow 509 
performers to strategically allocate attentional resources. This top-down modulation of 510 
attention (i.e., executive control) helps the performer to identify sensory, affective and motor 511 
affordances that invite the possibility for new and improved ways of performing a skill 512 
(Bermudez, 2016). It seems that through deliberate and discursive practice performers 513 
develop an increasingly sophisticated understanding of how to use executive control (Toner 514 
et al. 2016). For example, as one becomes more sensitive to the parametric structures that 515 
govern performance one learns how to use this information for top-down adjustment of 516 
proximal and strategic control (Christensen, Bicknell, McIlwain, & Sutton, 2015).  517 
Of course, the practical mastery that characterises skilled action can only be acquired 518 
through active engagement – that is, by developing a sensory appreciation of how different 519 
movements produce different effects on the environment. And yet, through such embodied 520 
practice experts accumulate a vast amount of experience (much of which will have been 521 
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conceptualised and which will be available to conscious recall) that they can reflect upon and 522 
use to influence what they do and how they do it. Acknowledging the role played by both 523 
sensory appreciation and reflective processes should help us avoid severing the tie between 524 
mind and body. Indeed, the concept of habitual reflexivity may allow us to account for the 525 
skilled agent’s ability to slide back-and-forth between reflective and pre-reflective states. 526 
Ultimately, the capacity to be reflexive about one’s bodily engagement in the world becomes 527 
deeply rooted in the habitus itself.  528 
Given the generative nature of habitus, it is important to consider the types of inter-529 
disciplinary work that will allow researchers to identify how performers are capable of 530 
enhancing their bodily capacities over time. To describe and better understand embodied 531 
action, researchers may wish to employ methods that are “truly grounded in the carnal 532 
realities of the lived sporting bodies” (Hockey & Allen-Collinson, 2007, p. 116). One 533 
possible method is Allen-Collinson and Hockey’s phenomenological-based mode of enquiry 534 
which has proven particularly illuminating in helping researchers to better understand the 535 
‘fleshy’ realities of moving and sensuous sporting bodies (e.g., Hockey & Allen-Collinson, 536 
2009). Phenomenological approaches can provide researchers with the rich descriptions 537 
necessary to generate testable hypotheses in this field. The use of digital technology might 538 
allow researchers to conduct more fine-grained observations of how gestures are coproduced 539 
with verbalizations and bodily movements (Núñez, 2012). In a sporting context, researchers 540 
could follow this approach by exploring speech-gesture coproduction or analyse bodily 541 
movement in didactic learning. Neuroscientific approaches might also shed further light on 542 
the malleability of habitus. Recent findings regarding the ‘plasticity’ of the human brain 543 
mitigate against biological determinism by showing that we have the ability to initiate self-544 
change (see Pitts-Taylor, 2010). Further exploration of these approaches are, unfortunately, 545 
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beyond the scope of the current article but it is worthwhile to flag this body of work as a 546 
potential resource for those interested in embodiment and skilled action.  547 
Conclusion   548 
In emphasizing the unconscious nature of habitus many theorists appear to have 549 
ignored, or largely downplayed, the hugely important role that consciousness plays in 550 
allowing elite performers to refine and improve their embodied habits. However, it is also 551 
important to recognise that in his later work Bourdieu acknowledged that conscious 552 
computation may be required when habitus proves insufficient as a basis for our actions. In 553 
seeking to address this possibility, my goal was not to privilege consciousness by arguing that 554 
performers execute complex skills by drawing on rules or internal representations to guide 555 
their action. Embodied theorists have rightly rejected a mind/body dualism by arguing that 556 
cognitive processes are causally related to bodily affects. Instead, I argued that it is our very 557 
capacity for reflexivity – itself deeply rooted in the habitus – which allows us to act back 558 
upon ourselves and to enact change. Such change is possible because skilled performers are 559 
highly attuned to the kinaesthetic and proprioceptive sensations that accompany their 560 
movement.  561 
As Noble and Watkins (2003) argue we should be careful not to sever the tie between 562 
practical and discursive thought. As we work our way through our world of action we 563 
inevitably accumulate bodily affects that eventually sediment into a series of dispositions and 564 
yet we must also recognise that actors may use reflexivity/conscious computation to shape 565 
these dispositions. There is little doubt that the body possesses its own intelligence but a 566 
reliance on unthinking spontaneity is unlikely to help skilled performers address the complex 567 
challenges that are a ubiquitous feature of their everyday regimes. Unfortunately, a continued 568 
reliance on spontaneity or pre-reflective bodily awareness cannot foster intelligent habit or 569 
prevent the acquisition of inflexible modes of bodily functioning. The reflexive nature of the 570 
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habitus allows the skilled performer to advance his/her bodily capacities and equips the 571 
habitus with a greater agentic function without necessarily creating an imbalance in favour of 572 
agency as opposed to structure (Noble & Watkins, 2003).  573 
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Notes 577 
1. Sheets-Johnstone (1999; 2012) challenged dualistic notions of the body by 578 
emphasizing the primacy of movement through an exploration of the ways in which 579 
kinetic dynamics inform our lives. She was critical of enactive approaches which 580 
tended to ‘dissolve the subject of action into neurology and the subject’s action into 581 
motorology’ (2012: 198). These perspectives lack what she terms ‘experiential 582 
moorings’ by failing to account for the ‘kinaesthetic awareness of a qualitative kinetic 583 
dynamic that is created in the flow of the living present’ (Sheets-Johnstone, 2012: 584 
198). Blackman and Venn (2010) suggest that the latter idea may help replace notions 585 
of bodies as ‘dumb matter’ with what might be termed a ‘somatically felt’ body. The 586 
question of how such embodied data may be collected is one that continues to 587 
stimulate discussion amongst body-studies scholars. One potentially useful approach 588 
is Walkerdine’s (2001) interview method which invites the interviewer to explore 589 
their visceral and affective responses to an interview. See Body & Society, special 590 
issue on ‘Affect’, for a discussion of how bodies should be defined by their capacities 591 
to affect and be affected and some of the methodological innovations that may help 592 
researchers address this process.  593 
 594 
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